We print below the first half of the essay “Marx and Freud,” which forms the second of three chapters of the 1968 book Modern Mental Reality and Marxism by Czech Marxist philosopher, historian, and aesthetic theorist Robert Kalivoda (1923–1989). The chapter is preceded in the book by an essay entitled “The Dialectics of Structuralism and the Dialectics of Aesthetics,” which offers a critique of the Hegelian basis of Marxist aesthetics and attempts to supplement Marxism with principles drawn from Kantianism and structuralism. The book’s third chapter, “Marxism and Libertinism,” presents a genealogy of the Marxian ideal of freedom and equality, the sources of which the author finds – perhaps surprisingly – in the cultural paradigm of Romanticism and in the ideology of libertinism. Throughout the book, Kalivoda pursues two primary goals: to philosophically investigate the meaning of (modern) reality, and to offer a systematic basis for a humanist Marxism. Kalivoda argues that Marxism overcomes the metaphysical conception of human existence and can be used as a robust methodological basis for a general dialectical theory of human existence.

Generally speaking, “Marx and Freud” offers a Marxist interpretation and critique of psychoanalysis akin to the well-known treatises by such classic thinkers as Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm. In Sigmund Freud’s later writings, this originally therapeutic method gained a philosophical and anthropological dimension. According to Kalivoda, this justifies attempts to revise psychoanalysis from a philosophical perspective. However, it is typical of Kalivoda’s dialectical method that the essay presents not only a Marxist critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, but also that Marxism itself is extended into the psychoanalytic dimension. Kalivoda argues that human existence contains important “natural” elements in addition to those socioeconomic and historical determinants that had been rather one-sidedly accentuated by most Marxist materialists. Kalivoda interprets the sixth thesis on Feuerbach in this sense: the human being cannot be reduced to a “social” dimension, because there are “natural” elements that are irreducible. Kalivoda attempts to situate Marx’s conception of these elements within the context of his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, which preceded the “Theses on Feuerbach,” and The German Ideology (1845–6), which immediately followed them. The reader of Contradictions may note that in this respect Kalivoda was engaged in comradely polemics with other reform-Communist authors like the more radically historicist (and more Hegelian) Karel Kosík, whose essay “Classes and the Real Structure of Society” we printed in our 2017 volume. Kalivoda lays out a vision of humanist Marxism that does not rely on what he regards as a metaphysical conception of alienated human essence, but is based rather on a notion of inalienable human nature, above all on the human’s need to satisfy hunger and sexual desire.

Kalivoda’s efforts to dialectically combine the early Marx and the late Freud took place, of course, against a specific historical-cultural backdrop – Kalivoda’s open approach to Marxism had several domestic predecessors. He attaches special importance to the work of Bohuslav Brouk (1912–1978), Záviš Kalandra (1902–1950), Karel Teige (1900–1951), and the Czech Surrealist Group, with which Brouk, Kalandra and Teige all collaborated. Robert Kalivoda’s presentation and reinterpretation of this tradition of Czech critical thought, much of which is unavailable in English translation, lends additional value to this seminal study of Eastern European Marxism.

“Marx and Freud” appears here for the first time in English, in a translation by Ashley Davies.

Roman Kanda
Psychoanalysis was established as a therapeutic method, which gradually became a general psychology, and in the work of Freud and other psychoanalysts later acquired a dimension of philosophical anthropology.\(^3\) The very fact that psychoanalysis was progressively transformed into philosophical anthropology calls naturally for a philosophical interpretation and evaluation of psychoanalysis. Yet even if this were not the case, philosophical interest in psychoanalysis as a certain academic discipline would be no less natural. After all, philosophy, out of which all academic fields have historically emerged – both the sciences of non-human nature and the human sciences – does not lose its “raison d’être” even after specialised sciences have become independent of it.

The progressive and constantly crystallising specialisation of individual academic disciplines is of an extremely contradictory nature. Specialised science, precisely thanks to its independence, brings an immense sum of extraordinarily important observations. Nevertheless, its ability to interpret these observations is limited precisely by the borders within which it has established its independence. The need for deeper and more holistic interpretations, the need for a broader structural delineation of the actual object of investigation – this requirement is an entirely integral component of any scientific knowledge – necessarily leads specialised science beyond its specialised limits: because otherwise it would not be able to interpret even certain contextual conditions of its specialised subject. There is only one structure of reality, however differentiated, and the links and moments in this structure pass into and mutually shape one another. As a result, a general theory of reality and philosophy, seriously endeavouring to attain philosophical scientific knowledge, is not antiquated by the development of specialised scientific knowledge; on the contrary, as the specialisation of the sciences proceeds, the need for a philosophical interpretation of reality only becomes and will continue to become more urgent.

And if it is said, with subtle or “unsubtle” scepticism, that philosophy merely “totalises” the results of specialised knowledge, then it is evident that this conception of “totalisation” has not yet transcended the limits of the positivist understanding of the relationship between philosophy and specialised science. Scientific philosophy cannot merely summarise what has already been observed elsewhere. It must itself contribute to concrete knowledge through an endeavour to interpret the structural relationship of the elements of the structure formed by the topics of the specialised sciences. In this way it can contribute not only to knowledge of the whole structure, that is, the totality, but also to knowledge of its elements. Herein resides the actual sense of the “totalisation” of philosophical knowledge.

If we turn to that object of knowledge that is the human being, then it is evident that “somatic” anthropology, psychology, sociology, and historiography form the four

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\(^3\) Throughout this essay Kalivoda will use the term “anthropology” in the sense of philosophical anthropology, the investigation into the fundamental nature and meaning of the human being. (Editors’ note)
fundamental academic fields in which the study of human existence is conducted. Let us leave aside the fact that these fields are becoming subdivided and will likely continue to be subdivided into a whole range of further specialised disciplines. The need for philosophical anthropology now resides in the fact that the knowledge of human existence in all its totality – and it is only thus that human existence can be known in the full sense of the word – necessarily requires an investigation of the entire structural relationship and structural transitions of those instances and spheres of human life that are the object of investigation in these four fundamental fields of the human sciences. If the scholarly activity developed by specialists in these fields eventually achieves “totalising” focus, then this will be wonderful. Philosophers can only welcome such a liquidation of philosophy. A range of specialised scientists have already made a positive contribution to this “liquidation” of philosophy – specifically by becoming philosophers themselves. This is the case with Freud, who during the course of his work became a philosophical anthropologist “par excellence.” Nevertheless, this entrance of specialist science into philosophy is barely beginning; in fact it appears that it will never be a “mass phenomenon” and that the advancing specialisation of scientific knowledge will on the contrary extend the sphere of the “unknown,” in which quite fundamental processes of social-human life are played out. Shockingly, these processes do not manifest a need to fit into the work plans of the specialised human sciences. The human being is evidently incorrigible, and although it has been, up to now, ever more bludgeoned by the division of labour, it at least resists the division of scientific labour.

For this reason it is also not possible to cast philosophical anthropology onto the scrapheap. Quite the opposite. Naturally, it is necessary to view its possibilities with detachment. Bakunin was correct when he expressed this reservation towards the human sciences one hundred years ago. The human being did not choose the “classic path” to liberation, which at the time glittered in its “Hegelian” purity. It stubbornly refuses to break “the yoke of its alienation.” Why?

If contemporary philosophical anthropology, which is only now beginning to take shape, sheds over the course of time at least a little light on the historical situation of the contemporary human being, then perhaps it can assist us somewhat in specifying also the human being’s further historical prospects.

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It was necessary to state these initial comments in advance also in order to clarify that there is nothing unnatural in a critical philosophical investigation of psychoanalysis, even if certain analysts have raised categorical objections to this action on the part of “uninitiated non-analysts.” It is an objective fact that psychoanalysis has ceased to be mere therapy and has become at the very least general psychology; this considerably alters the situation precisely in the area of methodology: the method of analysis applied in therapy, which is temporally, physically, and mentally extraordinarily demanding, is technically inapplicable where we have a psychoanalytic interpretation of the psy-
cho-social facts of the “normal” human being in its mass social occurrence. In this sphere it is necessary to turn to the methodology of psycho-sociological investigation. Where psychoanalysis, with Freud as its chief exponent, develops into an interpretation of broader socio-historical contexts and a general theory of humanity, there is no alternative than to turn to the methods of historical investigation and to philosophical analysis. Philosophical analysis, much as it may appear to be speculative, is often the only way of shedding new light on the concrete interpretation of concrete material, and thus of marking out new, quite relevant problems and new, quite concrete methodological tasks for the concrete methodology of specialised science.

The following reflections primarily concern the significance of the fundamental theorems of psychoanalysis for the development of philosophical anthropology – more precisely speaking, the anthropological-philosophical significance of Freud’s theoretical work, especially in the final form into which it crystallised in his last work, An Outline of Psychoanalysis. Although not everyone may share the feeling that such a reflection could have reciprocal significance also for psychoanalysis itself, in this it loses nothing of its plausibility.

The interpretation that follows is not some kind of “universal philosophical” interpretation. Here too a concrete delineation is required: it is an attempt to outline a critical interpretation of psychoanalysis from the perspective of the Marxist philosophy of the human being, which is nevertheless at the same time an attempt to critically integrate psychoanalysis into the Marxist philosophy of the human being, to further develop the central problematics of this philosophy precisely by means of this critical integration.

This endeavour is far from extraordinary; it adds itself to an old tradition and consciously updates this tradition. Psychoanalysis has been and is to some or other degree and by various means utilised and absorbed in other philosophical conceptions – for example, in existentialism. However, it is possible to state without hyperbole that a mutual “compulsion” and attraction has been manifested most pronouncedly in the relationship between psychoanalysis and Marxism.

This statement may appear paradoxical only if we consider those forced, rationally “ungraspable” and rather amusing criticisms of psychoanalysis that have abounded in “Marxist” publications over the last decades to be a critical stance of genuine Marxist thought. However, these excesses had essentially nothing in common with creative Marxism. Genuine creative Marxist thought was rendered heretical in the past decades by Stalinism, and the fate of its exponents was arduous, painful, and often tragic.

Such a tragic fate befell for example Wilhelm Reich, the first psychoanalyst to seriously attempt a synthesis of Marxism and psychoanalysis, who at the beginning of the 1930s was excommunicated by both the German Communists and by psychoanalysts, and who ended his life in an American prison a number of years after the Second World War. Around this same time, the Czech Marxist Záviš Kalandra, who made remarkable use of psychoanalysis in order to interpret old Czech legends, was one of the first victims of Stalinist repression in Czechoslovakia. Bohuslav Brouk, a member of the Prague
surrealist group, systematically attempted to accomplish the same thing in Bohemia before the Second World War as Reich was endeavouring to do in Germany. He was unable to cope with the severe blows of historical developments, and after the war he became an anti-Marxist, eventually emigrating from Czechoslovakia.

The activity of the surrealists and the adherents of the Frankfurt School of philosophy has involved above all a long-term systematic endeavour to critically integrate psychoanalysis into the Marxist conception of the human being; for entire decades they have been the constant target of harsh criticism; it is only recently that these sweeping, mostly uninformed and frequently malevolent and insulting condemnations have begun to abate. Among the surrealists, an exceptional role in the creative Marxist interpretation of psychoanalysis was played by the recently deceased André Breton, especially in his book *Communicating Vessels*, which he wrote at the beginning of the 1930s, when he himself arrived at a Marxist position. The representatives of the Frankfurt School include primarily Erich Fromm, a psychoanalyst who since the early 1930s has based his concept of the human being on the works of Marx and Freud, and also the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, whose 1955 book *Eros and Civilization* represents to this day the indisputable highpoint of endeavours so far to arrive at a mutual integration of Marx and Freud, and is an essential springboard for every further work in the field.

It is impossible not to see that Czech intellectual activity is becoming a significant component of this international endeavour. In Bohemia, this work is carried out above all in connection with the Prague surrealist group, of which Bohuslav Brouk was a member and with which Záviš Kalandra closely collaborated. The leading exponents of Czech surrealism, Karel Teige and Vítěslav Nezval, in the course of their wide-ranging activity also made a highly significant contribution to the creative utilisation of Freud’s discoveries in the development of a modern Marxist conception of the human being. And it is impossible not also to emphasise the very interesting fact that among the founders of Czech Marxist historiography, a prominent position is occupied by the historians affiliated with the “Historical Group” (Václav Husa, Jan Pachta, Jaroslav Charvát, and others), who at the end of the 1930s published the compendium *History and the Present*, and who introduced us to the idea of a second “Marxist-Freudian” centre encompassing the “Frankfurt School” and in particular, of course, Erich Fromm.

The Marxist integration of Freud therefore has a long tradition not only on an international scale, but also in the Czech lands. It is even possible to say that this Czech component is a quite fundamental phenomenon within this international tradition. This tradition represents not only a certain historical continuity – as shall be evident from

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4 In the original, Kalivoda incorrectly referenced Marcuse’s book as *Eros and Civilisations*. Kalivoda may have read the book in German translation. (Editors’ note)

the following analysis, there also originates also within it an intellectual continuity, a certain method of posing the problem.

The following reflection consciously adheres to this continuity. At the same time, this reflection grows out of a conviction that the critical absorption of Freud by Marxism is not an eclectic blend of heterogeneous elements, but that on the contrary Marx and Freud are of a similar order. Precisely with regard to other philosophical conceptions it is possible to speak of eclecticism in the utilisation of Freud. The absorption of Freud can even be a form of “transubstantiation” of a certain philosophical approach, a kind of transformation of that philosophy’s “essential nature” – as is the case for example with regard to Sartre’s existentialism. However, the “essential nature” of Marxism does not “transubstantiate” with the critical absorption of Freud; rather, it becomes enhanced.

Over the last century, the Marxist theory of the human being has focused predominantly on socio-historical factors, on class-social, class-economic, class-political, and class-ideological factors, which have played a decisive role in the development of society. This is understandable, since the “natural components of the human being,” which indisputably operate within the human being in all societies and at all times, have entered the historical process more or less exclusively in a form pre-shaped by social class. It did not appear to be particularly necessary to conduct an investigation, for example, into whether the category of “class interest” or “economic interest” reflected another, underlying layer which somehow further conditions class interest: to ask how class economic interest can emerge in the first place; economic interest and class interest are after all indisputably attached to the elementary, naturally human components of the human being, on what is natural in the human.

If it was necessary, in forming the materialist theory of history, to shatter the abstract anthropological-naturalist conceptions that stood in the path of creating a historical-genetic conception of the development of the human being, which revealed the role of class forces in the entire history of human society, then today it is necessary to devote far greater attention precisely to those “natural components” of human existence. At a time when the human being is beginning to emancipate itself from the class conditions within which the individual as well as species being have appeared for entire centuries and millennia, these natural components of human existence are acquiring ever more significance. Circumstances which in the development of class society were, so to speak, on the periphery of history – circumstances which relate to general forms of human existence and human subsistence, to general forms and manifestations of lifestyle, to general forms of ethical interest and ethical values, to the “natural foundations” of human culture – these circumstances come unstoppably to the fore of the historical process at the moment when this historical process ceases to be a “prehistoric” matter.

6 “Prehistory,” of course, does not refer here to the time before written history. It refers to the time
A new situation thus arises, which in a certain sense confronts Marxist philosophy with problems entirely opposite to those that were addressed one hundred years ago. It is precisely the pressure of these problems that forces us to return once again to Marx and Engels and to determine precisely the method by which they approached these questions. In such a reassessment, a matter emerges which – although it is of quite fundamental importance – has been entirely sidelined and for the most part entirely misinterpreted over the last century: the fact that Marx and Engels, in overcoming Feuerbach’s “anthropologism,” never entirely dissolved the “natural” human being into a “social” human being that historically produces its objective life necessities, that is, into an essentially “economic-social” being.

With regard to Engels, his conception of materialism from the preface to the first edition of The Origin of the Family is in any case rather well known. However, it is Marx’s position that is of cardinal importance, for the very reason that for contemporary adherents of the “Marxist philosophy of praxis,” the value of Engels is reduced practically to nought, and Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” are for them practically the only point of departure for Marxist philosophy – naturally in connection with the entirety of Marx’s work. Yet it appears that this conception of the philosophy of praxis, in which before communism, when human developments are limited by class conditions. Yet even when these socially specific limitations are removed, Kalivoda argues, history will still be limited by the universal natural components of human existence, such as the need to satisfy hunger and sexual urge. (Editors’ note)

I emphasise that this applies only in a certain sense. It would be a cardinal error to assume that the philosophical investigation of human society could be limited to this issue, or that it is possible to resolve this issue independently of the classic sets of problems of historical materialism. These continue to be of fundamental importance and topicality. What is necessary with respect to these problems is a deeper investigation into the fundamental laws of motion of the transition from capitalism to socialism and the fundamental laws of motion of the socialist formation, which to date we know entirely inadequately (and in certain respects do not know whatsoever). A deeper knowledge of these questions is essential also for a real and realistic solution to the anthropological issue we are concerned with here – though here the mutual interdependence applies also in the other direction. The materialist theory of history, in its traditional historical-materialist dimension, has basically still not been concretely elaborated. It remains an immense, uncompleted task to penetrate into the concrete dialectics of history – and this applies even to the epoch of capitalism, which Marx analysed in a certain extreme “essential” purity in his Capital.

I.e., The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. (Editors’ note)

“According to the materialistic conception, the determining factor in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of immediate life. But this itself is of a twofold character. On the one hand, the production of the means of subsistence, of food, clothing and shelter and the tools requisite therefore; on the other, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The social institutions under which men of a definite historical epoch and of a definite country live are conditioned by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labour, on the one hand, and of the family on the other.” Friedrich Engels, Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 26: Engels 1882–89 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), pp. 129–276; here pp. 131–132; emphasis by R. K.
the human being is reduced to its historical dimension, rendered the architect of history and practically stripped of natural components – this conception, despite its great importance for the renaissance of creative Marxist thought, is not entirely adequate to Marx’s conception of the human being as it was shaped from the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, through the "Theses on Feuerbach" and the *Grundrisse* to *Capital*. It is necessary, of course, to acknowledge the Marxist ethos behind this conception – its "Marxian" pedigree nevertheless resides in the fact that it is not sufficiently critical of Marx: today's "philosophy of praxis" has not as yet been capable of delimiting those romantic-metaphysical elements that are evident in the young Marx, and which can be felt even in the "mature" Marx; rather it adopts them in its somewhat metaphysical conception of human "alienation."

In general it is possible to state in advance that Marx, when he criticised Feuerbach for his "anthropologism," never denied that the human being, even as an "ensemble of social relations," is more than a mere point of intersection and creator of these social relations. Marx’s renowned sixth thesis on Feuerbach, which up to now has ordinarily been understood in this sense, has evidently been entirely incorrectly interpreted from a semantic point of view, because it is not understood within its developmental context, in relation to the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* which preceded it and *The German Ideology* which immediately followed it.

However, in the nineteenth century the natural component of the human being was so downplayed in Marxist theory – including the works of Marx and Engels – and the socio-historical and class dimensions of human existence were so emphasized, that the synthesis of Freud’s "biologism" with Marx’s "historicism," which the surrealists and the


11 One way of understanding the sixth thesis on Feuerbach is to see it in relation to the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, where social-human essence is identified with the optimal development of human forces under communism. In this case the concept has a genuinely concrete content. We may then genuinely understand alienation to mean alienation from the “human essence,” as Marx presents it in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. Nevertheless, such an interpretation is not only pure anthropologism but is also metaphysical anthropologism, which Marx later abandoned; it is thus irrelevant if at the same time we declare our endeavour to overcome not only metaphysics but also "anthropological philosophy." A second option is to link Marx’s sixth thesis to *The German Ideology* and to understand the social “essence” of the human being as an “ensemble of social relations” for the entire period of the historical existence of the social human. This interpretation is not true to *The German Ideology* or to the entire subsequent work of Marx, because during this period Marx no longer worked with the term "essence" in the *positive* sense, even if the meaning of the term is latently contained in certain formulations on alienation and certain uses of the concept of "nature." This latent meaning is however bound to Marx's original concept of human essence from the *Manuscripts* and has absolutely nothing in common with some kind of neutral designation of the "ensemble of social relations" of any historical epoch. To understand this "social-human essence" is a rather naïve attempt to maintain a certain term which conceptually and in terms of its content is reduced to a trivial tautology.
“Frankfurt” philosophers attempted at the beginning of the 1930s, must have appeared to the regular and historically fixed Marxist consciousness of the time to be deeply erroneous, if not reprehensible. It seemed like an attempt to combine fire with water. Nevertheless, the work conducted from the beginning of the 1930s by thinkers from both currents is of exceptional significance not only for the actual integration of psychoanalytic discoveries into the Marxist conception of the human being; it was in direct connection with this endeavour that the fundamental prerequisites were lain for re-establishing an essential proportionality in the Marxist view of human existence itself, for authentically interpreting this view and for further developing it, which will no longer be solely a development of Marxist social theory, but also a development of Marxist anthropology.

The surrealists performed this re-establishment by a kind of peculiar rational intuition, whilst they mostly did not engage in a detailed historical study of the development of Marx’s opinions, although one exception to this was Karel Teige. Nevertheless, the formulations at which they arrived may, in spite of their obviousness and “lack of academic cultivation,” provide a more immediate point of departure for further work than the philosophically erudite study by Erich Fromm on Marx’s concept of Man, which in our opinion can be utilised for further work only after certain, quite fundamental critical revision.

Fromm’s study Marx’s Concept of Man is nevertheless, despite this – or perhaps rather precisely for this reason – one of the most fundamental works on Marx’s humanism that has in recent years been presented from a Marxist perspective. Its exceptional significance consists in the fact that it clearly demonstrates the deep continuity between the thought of the young Marx and the “mature” Marx, and thus enables us to definitively repudiate those opinions which, in various forms and to varying degrees, have not acknowledged this continuity. Within the context of our interpretation, we are naturally interested above all in the fact that Fromm, who as a psychoanalyst has worked fruitfully since the beginning of the 1930s with the concept of elementary

12 In his systematic study of Marx and especially Marx’s early writings, Teige was exceptional not only among the surrealists, but also among the Marxists of the 1930s in general. Precisely through this creative utilisation and application of Marx’s early writings, on a range of important issues Teige was able to take positions which transcended the ordinary and represented a revelatory intellectual contribution which, in contrast to the views of many of his contemporaries, have retained their validity to this day.

Marx and Freud

psychic energy, which he understands as a certain general motive force in the human being, succeeded in rediscovering a perspective in the work of Marx which points to a regular affinity between Marxist humanism and Freudian psychoanalysis. Fromm therein demonstrated not only that Marx in his early phase worked with the category of a general and constant human nature, but also that this category is a constant category throughout the whole of Marx’s work.¹⁴

¹⁴ As evidence Fromm presents the “mature” Marx’s polemic against Bentham: “To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch.” Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man (New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 23; citation from Capital: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 35: Karl Marx, Capital Volume I (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996), p. 605.

At the same time Fromm demonstrates that here the “mature” Marx of Capital practically repeats after the “young” Marx of the early writings; since Marx had already differentiated between two types of human drives and appetites: the constant or fixed ones, such as hunger and the sexual urge, which are an integral part of human nature, and which can be changed only in their form and the direction they take in various cultures, and the “relative” appetites, which are not an integral part of human nature but which “owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication.” (Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, p. 24; citation from Marx: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1/5, ed. Vladimir Adoratsky [Berlin: Marx-Engels-Verlag, 1932], p. 596–597 Fromm’s translation.) [Although Fromm incorrectly cites his source here as The Holy Family, he references the volume of the Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe containing The German Ideology (vol. 1/5); yet the page he cites (p. 359) does not actually contain the quoted line (see Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, p. 35). Kalivoda evidently corrected Fromm’s mistake. – editors’ note]

This concerns a passage from The German Ideology, from the section “Saint Max,” which was crossed out in the manuscript. It is nevertheless an authentic text by Marx and Engels, who themselves edited the manuscript and made the definitive corrections of style and content. It was a great achievement of Erich Fromm to have identified the core of the fundamental thesis of this passage in Marx’s Capital.

Because this is an exceptionally momentous passage, which is of fundamental significance for an understanding of Marx and Engels’ conception of the elementary factors of human existence and of the relationship between communism and human nature, it is necessary to present it in its entirety, even if it is relatively voluminous:

Since they attack the material basis on which the hitherto inevitable fixedness [Fixität] of desires and ideas depended, the Communists are the only people through whose historical activity the liquefaction of the fixed [fix werdenden] desires and ideas is in fact brought about and ceases to be an impotent moral injunction, as it was up to now with all moralists “down to” Stirner. Communist organization has a twofold effect on the desires produced in the individual by present-day relations; some of these desires – namely desires which exist under all relations, and only change their form and direction under different social relations – are merely altered by the Communist social system, for they are given the opportunity to develop normally; but others – namely those originating solely in a particular society, under
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Marx’s thesis on the constant within human nature, namely hunger and sex, which may be merely modified within a certain historical epoch with regard to its form and focus, and which is a permanent component of Marx’s conception of the human being,

particularly conditions of production and intercourse – are totally deprived of their conditions of existence. Which of the desires will be merely changed and which eliminated in a Communist society can only occur in a practical way, by changing the real, actual "desires," and not by making comparisons with earlier historical conditions.

The two expressions: "fixed" [fix] and "desires" [Begierden], which we have just used in order to be able to disprove this "unique" fact of Stirner’s, are of course quite inappropriate. The fact that one desire of an individual in modern society can be satisfied at the expense of all others, and that this "ought not to be" and that this is more or less the case with all individuals in the world today and that thereby the free development of the individual as a whole is made impossible – this fact is expressed by Stirner thus: “the desires become fixed” [fix werden] in the egoist in disagreement with himself, for Stirner knows nothing of the empirical connection of this fact with the world as it is today. A desire is already its more existence something "fixed" [etwas "Fixes"], and it can occur only to St. Max and his like not to allow his sex instinct, for instance, to become “fixed” [fix werden lassen]; it is that already and will cease to be fixed only as a result of castration or impotence. Each need, which forms the basis of a “desire," is likewise something “fixed” ["Fixes"], and try as he may St. Max cannot abolish this “fixedness” [Fixität] and for example contrive to free himself from the necessity of eating within “fixed” [fixer, meaning "certain"; note R. K.] periods of time. The Communists have no intention of abolishing the fixedness [Fixität] of their desires and needs, an intention which Stirner, immersed in his world of fancy, ascribes to them and all other men; they only strive to achieve an organization of production and intercourse which will make possible the normal satisfaction [Befriedigung] of all needs, i.e., a satisfaction which is limited only by the needs themselves. (Karl Marx - Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works Vol. 5: Marx and Engels 1845–1847 [London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976], p. 21–539, here p. 255–256, emphasis and original German terms added by R. K.)

From this passage it follows not only that Marx and Engels characterise sex and hunger as fixed demands and needs, which thus form the constant layer of human existence; one page earlier in The German Ideology we read:

The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the domination of the flesh and “desires as a driving force” was because it regarded our flesh, our desires as something foreign to us; it wanted to free us from determination by nature only because it regarded our own nature as not belonging to us. For if I myself am not nature, if my natural desires, my whole natural character, do not belong to myself - and this is the doctrine of Christianity – then all determination by nature – whether due to my own natural character or to what is known as external nature – seems to me a determination by something foreign, a fetter, compulsion used against me. (Ibid., p. 254, emphasis by R. K.)

However, from this it also follows that Marx and Engels criticise Stirner’s concept of “fix” in the sense that they reject Stirner’s fixation, his fixing of the fundamental natural needs of the human being to certain “worldly conditions" (ibid., p. 255). Therefore, precisely in opposition to this
entirely refutes the view that Marx in his mature phase understood the human being merely as an “ensemble of social relations.”

However, the case is different with Marx’s conception of “human essence,” which it is necessary to differentiate sharply from Marx’s concept of “human nature,” and which the “mature” Marx genuinely abandons. Precisely the fact that Fromm erroneously identifies Marx’s concept of “human nature” with “human essence” evidently prevented him from tracing the continuity of Marx’s conception of “human nature” up to the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. Yet in the Manuscripts we find the most accomplished and developed formulation of Marx’s conception of human nature, which is also of central significance for recognising the relationship between Marx’s and Freud’s conceptions of the human being:

*Man* is directly a *natural being*. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with *natural powers, vital powers* – he is an *active* natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities – as *instincts*. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous objective being he is a *suffering*, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the *objects* of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are *objects* that he *needs* – essential *objects*, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a *corporeal*, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigour is to say that he has *real, sensuous objects* as the object of his being or of his life, or that he can only *express* his life in real, sensuous objects. [...] *Hunger* is a natural *need*; it therefore needs a *nature* outside itself, an *object* outside itself, in order to satisfy itself, to be stilled. [...] Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a *suffering* [Leidend] being – and because he feels that he suffers, a *passionate* being. Passion [Leidenschaft] is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.}

*relativisation of constant human demands, against their derivation from “the relations”* (thence the significance of “fix werden” “fixing”), Marx and Engels posits the *actual*, proper *fixedness, i.e., the fixity, permanence, constancy*, of these fundamental natural needs. These fundamental needs are not bound to social relations; they are not *created* thereby; they can only be *modified* by them. Understood in Stirner’s terms: though needs “fixed by certain relations” also have a genuine existence, they belong to the *second* group of motivations, precisely *those that are not fixed*. This argument is of fundamental significance to an understanding of Marx’s anthropology. In fact, it is a classic testimony of how in a work that allegedly “dissolved by historical-materialist means” the constant anthropic phenomena of the human being into “social relations,” these constant anthropic phenomena are on the contrary *conceptually specified* in the polemic against their “historical-materialist dissolution into social relations,” as was performed by Stirner.

Immediately after the quoted passage there follows a paragraph beginning with the sentence: “A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being [...]”, in which Marx sharply differentiates this human nature from the direct, natural nature of the human being, which he succinctly characterised above (ibid., p. 337). The fact that there is a deep qualitative difference between these two natures ensues entirely unequivocally from another passage in the Manuscripts, where it is stated that

As a result [of the alienation of the worker under capitalism – note R. K.], therefore, man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions – eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal. Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions. But taken abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal functions. (Ibid., pp. 274–275, emphasis by R. K.)

From the central discussion of the Manuscripts on “communism as a positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement” (ibid. p. 296) it follows entirely unequivocally that only the development of the total, naturally social human being under “positive” communism that will mean “the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man” (ibid.).

This distinction between the human being’s direct nature and human essence, which Marx makes absolutely consistently and unequivocally in the Manuscripts, is of cardinal importance for an understanding of Marx’s conception of the human being and of the developmental dynamic of this conception. We will touch upon this more in the third study [i.e. the third chapter of the book in which Kalivoda’s essay appeared – editors’ note]. For the purposes of this reflection it is necessary merely to note that the evidently metaphysical understanding of the communist human essence from the Manuscripts cannot be carried over into Capital, that the concept of human essence from the Manuscripts cannot be identified with the concept of human nature in Capital. The concept of human nature in Capital follows directly from the concept of direct human nature in the Manuscripts.

Fromm makes his incorrect identification of the two categories into one of the fundamental elements of his study (see Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, p. 23 and several other places). He is right in stating that it is possible to sense in places within Capital how the “human essence” of the Manuscripts finds its way into the “human nature” of Capital; for example in the celebrated passage from the 3rd volume where Marx writes that associated producers under communism “govern the human metabolism [...] in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature” (Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach [London: Penguin, 1991], p. 959, emphasis by R. K.). Nevertheless, this superlative attests to the fact that this concerns a mere “forcing” of the human essence into fields which have become lost to it. The issue of “alienation” is naturally more complicated, as we shall touch upon in the concluding study of this work [i.e. in “Marxism and Libertinism,” the final essay in Kalivoda’s book – editors’ note].

Fromm is also right that Marx’s sixth thesis on Feuerbach does not represent an absolute turn to a mere sociological assessment of the human being (cf. Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, pp. 63–64). However, his concrete argumentation is not adequate to the matter at hand. Fromm again incorrectly mixes “essence” with “nature” and does not see that in Marx’s conception of “human essence” as “the sum of social relations” and in his view that with Feuerbach “human essence [...] can be comprehended only as ‘genus,’ as an internal, dumb generality which merely naturally unites the many individuals” (Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” p. 145), Marx still quite unequivocally cleaves to the conception of human essence from the Manuscripts. This is substantiated fairly convincingly also by the tenth thesis, in which Marx states that ”The standpoint of the old materialism is ‘civil’ society; the standpoint of the new materialism is ‘human’ society, or socialised humanity” (Ibid.). Nevertheless, Fromm is again absolutely right that the entirely
This superb explanation of human nature\textsuperscript{16} by Marx illuminates a clear path to the key elements of Freud’s theory of human existence. And if we remind ourselves once more that according to Marx, universal human nature may be merely modified by society and history, persisting in its constancy throughout the course of history, then we shall be unable to deny that it was precisely the surrealists who in the 1930s renewed, updated and enhanced this forgotten fundamental premise of Marxist anthropology.\textsuperscript{17}

erroneous and exceptionally widespread idea that the sixth thesis on Feuerbach represented the final end of Marx’s “anthropologism” is entirely refuted by the fact that Marx, independently of his superficial interpreters, maintains the category of constant human nature.

It is necessary to appreciate the absolute openness and directness with which Fromm interprets Capital in the spirit of the Manuscripts and attempts to apply the ethos of the Manuscripts’ human essence. The tendency towards a similar conception exists also in other Marxist “philosophers of praxis,” even if they lack Fromm’s openness, purity, and consistency. We shall touch upon the consequences of what we consider to be this incorrect conception and these incorrect tendencies further in the concluding study. Within the given context it perhaps remains only to draw attention to the fact that the refined communist “human essence” of Marx’s “Manuscripts,” which is evidently the definitive point of departure also for Fromm’s conception of humanism, clearly also led Fromm as a psychoanalyst to distance himself greatly from Freud’s original standpoint and to become one of the leading exponents of “neo-analysis” [also known as “neo-Freudianism” – editors’ note], which in our view does not have the explanatory power of authentic Freudianism. This secession of Fromm, who was a protagonist and excellent exponent of the endeavour to integrate psychoanalysis into the Marxist philosophy of the human being, a secession evidently motivated by a consistent and honourable devotion to the ideal humanist vision of the young Marx, can only be genuinely regretted.

\textsuperscript{16} If we are to accumulate further evidence that this conception from the Marx of the Manuscripts persists in the work of the mature Marx, let us recall also this laconic formulation from another of Marx’s essential writings, one from which Capital was born, the Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: “anderseits, soweit ich bestimmt werde, forciert durch meine Bedürfnisse, ist es nur meine eigne Natur, die ein Ganzes von Bedürfnissen und Trieben ist, das mir Gewalt antut [...]” Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Dietz, 1953), p. 157, emphasis by R. K. [Kalivoda quotes the text here in German. In English, the passage reads “if I am determined, forced, by my needs, it is only my own nature, this totality of needs and drives, which exerts a force upon me.” Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 245, with Kalivoda’s emphasis – editors’ note.]

\textsuperscript{17} André Breton expressed this in his inimitable poetic language in Communicating Vessels at the beginning of the 1930s:

In the clamor of crumbling walls, among the songs of gladness that rise from the towns already reconstructed, at the top of the torrent that cries the perpetual return of the forms unceasingly afflicted with change, upon the quivering wing of affections, of the passions alternately raising and letting fall both beings and things, above the bonfires in which whole civilizations conflagrate, beyond the confusion of tongues and customs, I see man, what remains of him, forever unmoving in the center of the whirlwind. Abstracted from the contingencies of time and place, he truly appears as the pivot of this very whirlwind, as the mediator par excellence. (André Breton, Communicating Vessels, trans. Mary Ann Caws and Geoffrey T. Harris [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990], p. 138, emphasis by R. K.)
It was expressed most precisely and in the most Marxian way, albeit with additional elements, by Karel Teige:

The poetic revolt advances beneath the banner of human freedom and human love; it is therefore an appeal to primordial dreams, to that “eternally human,” pre-social human existence that “with flesh and blood and brain belongs to nature” (Engels); it is a tendency to develop in their integrity the desires of the eternal human, modelled, cultivated and simultaneously deformed and imprisoned by the historical development of society. It is therefore also a tendency to break down the material and ideological barriers that teach the human to submit to the powerful of this world, to forsake pleasure and to put off the day of reckoning.  

And it is from these surrealist standpoints and formulations that Jan Mukařovský extracted the quite exact category of anthropological constitution, which he applied in his theoretical work. However, is it possible to consider Marx’s constant natural human nature as an anthropological constant in the full sense of the word? In order to clarify this issue, it is necessary to address a question to Sigmund Freud.

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19 See Mukařovský’s study “Can There Be a Universal Aesthetic Value in Art?” from 1939 [Kalivoda incorrectly lists the date as 1941, when the originally French-language article was first published in Czech – editors’ note], reprinted in Mukařovský’s Studie z estetiky (Prague: Odeon, 1966), pp. 78–84, here pp. 82–84. [The article has since been translated into English: Jan Mukařovský, “Can There Be a Universal Aesthetic Value in Art?” in Jan Mukařovský, Structure, Sign, and Function, trans. John Burbank and Peter Steiner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 57–69, here pp. 68–69. – editors’ note] Here Mukařovský employs a number of further terminological variants in addition to the term “anthropological constitution”; “general anthropological make-up,” “universal human anthropological foundation,” “constant,” and even “anthropological essence”; these are all expressions, however, of the same concept, which has nothing in common with metaphysical “human essence”; here the human constant is understood structurally (it is a matter of the constant “make-up” of the human being).

Oleg Sus, in his very valuable study “Člověk trvající a člověk náhodný v surrealistické estetice” [The enduring human and the chance human in surrealistic aesthetics] (Orientace 1966, no. 3, pp. 28–36, here p. 28 and subsequent), held up Mukařovský’s “anthropological constant” as a fundamental designation, over and above its terminological variants. We believe that this is entirely justified, since it really is a matter of expressing that which is enduring; the term “constant” also helps prevent a confusion with metaphysical “essence.” And the structural character of this constant must ensue from its conceptual delineation. Precisely this conceptual delineation of the human being’s “anthropological constant” is one of the fundamental goals of our current reflections.
We must not be too hasty, however, in seeking a response. Only a gradual examination of the concept of human nature will make it possible to attempt a definite answer. Most importantly, this reassessment necessarily leads us once again, in connection with the question concerning the character of human nature, to inquire into the nature of the material structure of human existence.

We have noted that Marx’s pithy characterisation of human nature in his Manuscripts illuminates a clear path to key elements of Freud’s conception of the human being. However surprising it may seem, Freud, in his conception of the elementary forces of human existence, in fact objectively follows Marx. He follows him primarily where Marx characterises drives as life forces, forming aptitudes and abilities of the human’s active natural being, as well as where Marx understands the human being as an object-oriented being, a suffering being who is limited by the fact that precisely the objects of his need, without which he cannot live, which are fundamentally essential for him, are independent of him.

Essentially this same position of interpretation can be found in Freud’s specific conception of impulses and in the fundamental Freudian principle of life necessity (Ananke), the fundamental conflict between the human being and reality as uncovered by Freud, between the pleasure principle and the reality principle.

However, at the same time Freud concretises and develops upon this shared conception of theirs. This concretisation then enables us also to resolve the dilemma we came upon in the Manuscripts, of the contradiction within which the young Marx understood direct human nature as completely animal and refined human essence as completely noble.

The immense significance of Freud’s theory of drives for the general theory of the human being lies above all in the fact that Freud’s drives – especially in the later phase of Freud’s doctrine – have absolutely nothing in common with mere physiological instincts. The entire sphere of the psyche, including its fundamental layers, the sphere of drives, the sphere of the id, is precisely a psyche that, though it has its physical organ and staging ground (Schauplatz) in the brain and in the nervous system, is not related to them in any direct way; although science may eventually be able to precisely localise mental processes within the nervous system, this localisation can contribute nothing to the understanding of these processes.20

This conception of the psyche has led and continues to lead many to qualify Freud’s teaching as idealist. Such an evaluation however results from a gross misunderstanding of the matter, since an understanding of the psyche as a relatively autonomous sphere which does not have a direct relationship to the nervous system does not mean a denial of the mutual interconnection in which the nervous apparatus plays the role of a certain

20 Cf. Sigmund Freud, “An Outline of Psychoanalysis,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 21 (1940), pp. 27–84, here p. 30. Unless sources are explicitly indicated, the following interpretation refers to this last work of Freud’s. The interpretation is however primarily an attempt to reach a “critical symbiosis” of Marx and Freud.
vessel (Schauplatz) for psychic processes; it is precisely such a mutual interconnection that has been demonstrated by psychoanalysis in a range of cases, in which psychic processes have influenced even neurophysiological processes.

However, the essence of psychoanalytic materialism consists in the fact that the primary layer of the psyche, the instinctual layer – Freud several times clarified this with regard to sexuality – is not bound to a definite physical organ, but finds its material source in all the physical zones. It is therefore a product of the object-oriented human being as a biological totality. At the same time, however, the psyche is irreducible to the physical organisation of the human being, because it lives its own psychic life.

We ourselves are of the opinion that the most appropriate term for conceptually grasping and delineating these specific features of the material instinctual layer of human existence is the term biopsychic energy. It appears that this represents a fundamental factor of the natural existence of the human being.

However, is this a natural factor in the ordinary sense of the word? Does this mean that the human being and the animal are absolutely identical? It is necessary to point out in advance that a certain idiosyncrasy in the way the human is compared to the animal often arises due to a somewhat metaphysical understanding of human greatness, uniqueness, and nobility; here too dialectics would not hurt, since the human being – stated briefly – is an animal and at the same time not an animal: this shall undoubtedly be the case also under communism, and has undoubtedly been thus also throughout the entire historical existence of the human being. As far as human nature goes, the pre-communist human does not differ from the future communist human.

Yet the human being differs from animals in its primary instinctual sphere. It is the variability of human instinctual energy, its conflictual dynamism, its capacity for metamorphosis, which differentiates human existential drives from animal instincts. Psychoanalysis, and above all Freud, has played an enormous role in this qualitative advance in the knowledge of the human being precisely by concretely analysing the mobility and transformative capacity of human instinctual energy, in particular human sexuality.21

The controllability of drives and the possibility of transforming their energy is a specific feature of human nature. This primary layer of the human psyche demarcates a certain differential dividing line between the human and the animal. Although this layer is the foundation, and it constantly remains the foundation, although it is historically primal, it cannot be explained and understood in isolation. In order for this regulation and variation of the instinctive forces of the human being to take place, a further fundamental component of human psychic structure must appear on the scene, namely the ego principle.

21 This mobility is not in conflict with the “conservatism” of drives. It is precisely the conflict between this conservatism of drives and the necessity of their regulation, precisely the necessity of transforming instinctual energy, that creates the specific dialectical quality of human life. Here, within the human being, the “animal” eternally clashes with the “human.”
In other words, the humanising of animal instincts into human drives does not take place automatically. It is forced by a certain organising and organisational power of the human psychic apparatus, which Freud located precisely in the ego principle. However, what is important is that this ego does not fall from the sky, but is itself necessitated by a conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle referred to above.

In Marx’s and Freud’s conceptions of the conflictual situation of the object-oriented human, we have uncovered a fundamental intellectual accord. Freud further concretised Marx’s idea, developing it by taking it as a point of departure for understanding the regulative principle, the ego principle. It is only with the emergence of the ego that the human emerges from the animal; it is only with the inception of this principle that animal instincts are transformed into a new quality, into human drives. An animal becomes extinct when a critical situation has made it unable to meet its life necessities and or to find objects in objective nature to satisfy its natural requirements. When this animal develops the capacity for adaptation with regard to its life necessities and finds a new way of satisfying its existential needs, this moment, or more precisely this historical epoch, is the turning point at which the animal does not die, but the human being is born.

The principle of variation, which is related to the origin of the ego, is what brings the human being into the world. It is necessary to supplement our reflections here with a certain crucial remark that must be addressed to Freud. We have seen that Marx delineated hunger and sex as the fundamental instinctual needs of the human being. We consider this delineation of the instinctual sphere of human existence to be absolutely correct. Freud concentrated on the examination of sexual energy, as he found that the satisfaction of the need for food offered none of the type of variability that is offered by sexual energy, and which forms the axis of human libidinousness. There can be no doubt that the need to satisfy hunger is difficult to sublimate. However, in the manner of satisfying hunger we find a different type of variability, which is of immense significance for the existence of the human being and for the destinies of human libidinousness.

Above all it is reasonable to assume that the situation of life privation which gave birth to the human being was generated by a fundamental requirement for satiation, and that the human being varied the animal method of satisfying hunger by inventing labour, that is, by inventing economy. However, this was not a “one-off” act connected solely to the actual genesis of the human. Hunger, to be sure, is not sublimated even later, but transformations in the method of satisfying hunger – similarly to those that took place in the actual genesis of the human being – continue to be of decisive significance for the further destinies of human libidinousness, and they form the foundation of the libido’s existence and transformations. Labour and economy, through which the human has been satisfying its hunger since the moment of its origin, create the conditions not only for the human being to humanise and develop its erotic life – both in non-sublimated and in sublimated form; labour and economy also create the possibility for the human being to realise itself and develop its aggressive forces, which we, together
with Freud, consider a component of the human instinctual foundation. The principle of power and control, within which human aggression is realised in sublimated form, emerges only upon the background of labour and economy, created by a human method of satisfying hunger. Hunger, in our view, along with the specific variability of the method of satisfying hunger, forms one of the fundamental components of the human instinctual sphere.

We thus arrive at a point from where it is perhaps possible to draw certain partial conclusions. In the materialist interpretation of the human being, there has hitherto predominated a tendency to interpret the motivations for human behaviour with reference to material-social, that is, economic, conditions, or to seek a human neurophysiological substrate. The material thread of human existence is constructed in the connection between these two points. Two factors are therefore in play: on the one hand the human being as a certain higher – in fact, the highest – organisation of matter; on the other, society and its economy. This framing of the problem then gives rise to various reflexological theories, which locate the key to human consciousness and to the fundamental manifestations of human life in the impulses that humans take from society or from non-human nature, and which they then process by means of the neurophysiological, cerebral apparatus.22

Materialism has been measured based on whether one understands thought and conscious activity as a product of matter (the brain) and whether one acknowledges moreover economic agency as a decisive force in the social-human determination of the human being. Because only these two factors existed for the materialist conception, Freudianism was declared “biologism,” and thus idealism. The notion that for the materialist conception of the human being it might be necessary to reckon with certain elementary biological forces, which are located somewhere in between the human neurophysiological organism and its social existence, but at the same time form an independent and particular unity – this notion has somehow been unavailable to this manner of thinking.

From the preceding interpretation it is perhaps evident that this “two-dimensional” form of the materialist interpretation of the human being is entirely inadequate and in principle entirely erroneous. Human existence is materially conditioned not only physiologically, not only socially, but above all bio-psychologically. In fact, it appears that bio-psychological factors are contained directly in the foundation not only of the

22 The disappearance of the psyche as an independent factor has led in recent years also to the practical liquidation of psychology. Psychology has been reduced to a mere component of the physiology of higher nervous activity. Freud has been “expunged” by Pavlov. The method by which Pavlov was set against Freud, however, was absolutely inadequate and did not correspond whatsoever to the logic of work in the two scientific disciplines that these thinkers represent so significantly. Freud and Pavlov are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary they exist in parallel and in correlation to one another.
natural but also of the social conditions of human existence. We have however attempted to intimate that in their variability these bio-psychological factors are no longer simple natural factors, but are natural-human factors.

The material structure of human existence is therefore a structural whole, in which the physiological-biological, bio-psychological, and socio-historical dimensions of the human being function in mutual interplay. We must not simply overlook the bio-psychological energy that is within the human being, since such an oversight would evidently be an oversight of the central nerve of human object-orientedness.

Although the neurophysiological processes that take place within the human being absolutely condition its human existence, they do not operate directly and immediately on the formation of the human's content.\footnote{23}

The fundamental interaction in the social-human life of the human being takes place between the bio-psychological and the social-economic dimensions. The key importance of the social-economic factor in human life is naturally beyond all doubt. Nevertheless, we have suggested in the preceding analysis that human economic activity, however much it may be in a certain sense a "base," is also in another sense a "superstructure." In relation to the bio-psychological forces of the human being, it is secondary; it is a certain social projection of human instinctual need.

Plainly speaking, it is not possible to consider the economic activity of the human being to be the material factor of the final instance. In the sense of content, the factor of the final instance is precisely human bio-psychological energy. This also means that the origin and development of layers of civilisation and culture cannot be explained materialistically only with reference to the economic-class interests of the historical person, despite the fact that these interests exert a decisive influence on the direction of cultural and civilisational activity and pronouncedly influence its social-ideological content. In addition to the fact that these very class interests are again merely certain transitional modes of deeper anthropic forces and pressures, the social person's bio-psychological energy is directly and unambiguously projected into the immediate life contents of its civilisational and cultural layers.

Finally, it is also necessary to emphasise that bio-psychological energy is itself a source of human activity. The reflexological interpretation of human history was entirely incapable of understanding and interpreting human activity precisely because it eliminated or ignored the internal bio-psychological forces of the human being. It is not sufficient merely to reflect that I perceive something, that I react to certain external stimuli and

\footnote{23 The search for physiological-chemical correlates of psychological processes is certainly an important and praiseworthy task, in which it is undoubtedly necessary to continue. Nevertheless, for a content-oriented study of the human psyche, the results of this research will evidently continue to be more or less irrelevant; and it is also possible that these correlates will never be found. If, for example, Lenin was not too enamoured of the poetry of Mayakovsky, the chemical correlate of this feeling would evidently not be found even if Lenin had lived a thousand years later.}
that I process these stimuli in some manner. By this method I completely fail to explain why I do everything that I do. Only if I understand that internal instinctual energy forces me into a permanent conflict with reality, that it forces the human to permanently occupy reality, and thus constantly to absorb and regenerate its existential modus vivendi, and that the sensory perception of the human being is a mere tool of this internal life need, only then can I understand that the human being is not a mere object and point of intersection of certain influences, but on the contrary itself operates within the sum of these influences as a fundamental kinetic unit.

A fundamental turn against this reflexological conception has been brought about recently by the “philosophy of praxis,” which after a long time has again elevated creative human activity to where it belongs: in the centre of Marxist philosophy. Nevertheless, even this “philosophy of praxis” so far generally suffers from abstraction in its conception of human praxis. To the question of how to understand human praxis, it responds with the assertion that practical activity is the fundamental determining factor of the human being; its response is therefore that the human is simply practically active; it adds that the human also remoulds nature and in doing so also remoulds itself; Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” are in various ways elaborated as evidence. Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” are an excellent thing, but they do not explain whatsoever why the human being is practically active.

This is clarified by Marx himself in the Manuscripts and by Freud in his conception of human nature and the reality principle. In the Manuscripts Marx succinctly demonstrated that the object-oriented, sensuous human being is object-oriented and sensuous precisely in the fact that in satisfying its fundamental needs and desires it must resort to objects independent of it. As a result it is a suffering being, constantly forced to resolve its life privation. The human being indisputably remoulds and humanises both nature and itself, but it is nevertheless, as an object-oriented, natural being, in the first place unilaterally dependent upon non-human nature. In this also lies the deepest existential source of human activity, and for this reason human bio-psychological energy is the driving force of the human being.

We have attempted to outline a certain understanding of the material structure of human existence. It is evident that this material structure must be understood as a totality of natural-human and social-human phenomena.

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24 Marx incisively illuminated the semantic dialectic between the meanings of “suffering” and “passion” by intentionally employing the German words “leidend” and “Leidenschaft,” in which this dialectic clearly shows forth.

25 As is perhaps evident, the term “existential” is not used here in the sense given to it by existentialist philosophy. This applies also to the use of this term elsewhere in this work.