

## EDITORIAL

# Ecosocialism in the Post-Communist Landscape

To write about issues of ecology in the present moment is to risk being perpetually out of date. When we prepared the call for papers for this issue, we highlighted some of the starkest warnings about the climate catastrophe and noted the increased attention to these issues among socialists and Marxists of various stripes. Both trends have accelerated rapidly in the year since. A report by the Chatham House policy institute published in September 2021 observed that on current trends there is a less than 5% chance of keeping global temperature increases below 2°C, and a less than 1% chance of achieving the 1.5°C target set forth in the Paris Agreement.<sup>1</sup> As we write this editorial in the summer of 2022, large parts of Western Europe are on fire, Britain is experiencing its hottest days ever, and residents of Prague are waking up to the faint smell of burning from the largest forest fire in the country's history 100km away. The floods that killed at least 243 people across Germany and Belgium in July 2021 were found to have been made up to nine times more likely by global heating.<sup>2</sup> According to one study, over a third of heat-related deaths in summer from 1991 to 2018 occurred as a result of human-caused global heating.<sup>3</sup> These events layer on top of the COVID-19 pandemic, not yet over, and increasingly recognised as intimately connected to the zoonotic overspill caused by deforestation and warming.<sup>4</sup> Climate catastrophe is already with us.

<sup>1</sup> Chatham House, "Climate change risk assessment 2021", September 2021, accessed October 10, 2022, <https://chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/2021-09-14-climate-change-risk-assessment-quiggin-et-al.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Damian Carrington, "Revealed: how climate breakdown is supercharging toll of extreme weather", *The Guardian*, August 4, 2022, <https://theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/04/climate-breakdown-supercharging-extreme-weather>.

<sup>3</sup> Ana Maria Vicedo-Cabrera et al., "The burden of heat-related mortality attributable to recent human-induced climate change", *Nature Climate Change* 11 (June 2021), pp. 492–500.

<sup>4</sup> See Andreas Malm, *Corona, Climate, Chronic Emergency: War Communism in the Twenty-First Century* (London and New York: Verso 2021).

In recognition of this, activists and theorists across the socialist and Marxist tradition have begun to engage with ecology to an extent they have not done so before. These range from concrete utopian speculation on alternatives, through calls to action and debates over the form it should take, to re-examinations of the Marxist tradition of thinking about nature.<sup>5</sup> It is in this context that we believe *Contradictions* has something distinctive to say, by raising these questions in the landscape – geographical, social, political, and ecological – of post-communism. This means thinking about the real history of “actually-existing” socialism beyond mythology and caricature, but also grappling with the way narratives of one-sided nostalgia or demonization dominate our present. One thing remains the same in both negative and positive portrayals of the past: Communism, which was once imaginable in a narrative of the future, became relegated to the past. A look at post-communism is thus not only a look at how communism once was, and then ceased to be, but also how communism was once *imaginable* as a point on the political horizon” but became “imaginable no longer”.<sup>6</sup>

When it comes to ecology, the dominant post-communist narrative tells a story that neatly combines Marxist theory and practice in order to dismiss both. The story goes something like this: Marx believed (perhaps infected by Hegel) in the total humanisation of nature through the endless expansion of productive forces, which would propel humanity to a realm of freedom and plenty – a sin frequently named “Prometheanism”.<sup>7</sup> Official communism put this Prometheanism to work through rapid industrialisation and grand hubristic plans, leading to environmental devastation on a mass scale, smokestacks, stripmines, and catastrophes like Chernobyl and the drying of the Aral Sea. In these equations, socialism = industrialisation, planning = domination, and revolutionary hope = utopian hubris. Never mind that the rapid transition to the most brutal forms of capitalism brought its own devastations and destructions, and that limited ecological repair in some areas was at the expense of outsourcing problems to others, socialism has nothing to teach us about ecology or the environment. Like so much of post-communist ideology, this draws a veil over a century’s worth of human experience and theoretical debate.

<sup>5</sup> A non-exhaustive list: Drew Pendergrass and Troy Vettesse, *Half-Earth Socialism: A Plan to Save the Future from Extinction, Climate Change and Pandemics* (London and New York: Verso, 2022); Salvage Collective, *The Tragedy of the Worker: Towards the Proletarocene* (London and New York: Verso, 2021); Holly-Jean Buck, *Ending Fossil Fuels: Why Net Zero is Not Enough* (London and New York: Verso, 2021); John Bellamy Foster, *Capitalism in the Anthropocene: Ecological Ruin or Ecological Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2022); Peter Gelderloos, *The Solutions are Already Here: Strategies for Ecological Revolution from Below* (London: Pluto, 2022); Chris Saltmarsh, *Burnt: Fighting for Climate Justice* (London: Pluto 2021); Bernd RieXinger et al. (eds), *A Left Green New Deal: An Internationalist Blueprint* (New York: Monthly Review Press).

<sup>6</sup> Joseph Grim Feinberg, “Why *Contradictions*: A Belated Manifesto”, this issue, p. 155.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of Prometheanism, see William B. Meyer, *The Progressive Environmental Prometheans: Left-Wing Heralds of a “Good Anthropocene”* (Cham: Palgrave MacMillian, 2016), pp. 12–18. For a contemporary criticism, see Pendergrass and Vettesse, *Half-Earth Socialism*.

Pulling back this veil reveals that both theory and practice were more complicated than the narrative suggests. When it comes to Marxist theory, few people have done more in the past 30 years to challenge the simplistic story than [John Bellamy Foster](#), and we are delighted to present an extensive interview with him regarding his work. We discuss his development of Marx's idea of a "metabolic rift" between humanity and nature and his defence of Engels's ideas of dialectics of nature against its critics in the Western Marxist tradition. This challenges the simple reading of Marx and Engels as aiming at the domination and exploitation of nature, while still insisting, against some fashionable trends in post-humanism, on recognising a distinction between humans and nature (an issue also raised in [Mikuláš Černík](#)'s review of Alf Hornborg's *Nature, Society, and Justice in the Anthropocene*). In their contribution, [Kenny Knowlton Jr.](#) and [Cameron Gamble](#) do something similar for Lenin. Picking up on recent calls for an "ecological Leninism", they look beyond Lenin's politics to his philosophy, arguing that it understands the human/nature relationship in a way that "closely approximates much of contemporary ecosocialist and eco-Marxist thought in such a way as to contribute to the development of metabolic rift theory and lay the theoretical ground for a revolutionary politics and praxis in the context of the ecological rift." (36-37) This challenges readings of Lenin that see him as promoting a naive primacy of matter over thought, presenting him instead as a theorist of metabolism and dialectical transformation, still relevant in times of climate crisis. In the Czech and Slovak issue, [Patrik Gažo](#)'s dictionary entry on ecosocialism further complicates the standard story by presenting a portrait of the richness of ecosocialist thought beyond the caricatures, drawing not only on Marx and Engels's thought but also the history of ecological anarchism, and bringing these debates into the present by discussing debates over degrowth and accelerationism. Likewise, [Peter Daubner](#) explores debates over the Anthropocene and Capitalocene, arguing for a nuanced understanding of the "Anthropocene" that takes into account the fundamental role of capitalism.

If Marx's own thought was more complex than that of the caricature, so was "actually-existing socialism". As Foster discusses in his interview, the early Soviet Union contained diverse ecological innovations, from the introduction of the first nature reserves to "the most advanced ecological science in the world" (95).<sup>8</sup> At the same time, under conditions of war and famine it faced the need to industrialise to survive. As socialism became increasingly tied to industrialisation and growth, the metabolic rift became, as the Salvage Collective put it, "to Soviet planners, a growth strategy".<sup>9</sup> Perhaps as a result, these heroic early years often combined an optimism about the capacity to master nature and release its potential with a sensitivity to nature's limits

<sup>8</sup> See also Kunal Chattopadhyay, "The Rise and Fall of Environmentalism in the Early Soviet Union", *Climate and Capitalism*, November 3, 2014, <https://climateandcapitalism.com/2014/11/03/rise-fall-environmentalism-early-soviet-union>.

<sup>9</sup> Salvage Collective, *The Tragedy of the Worker*, p. 50.

and a deep belief that communism would transform our relation to it. In this spirit, we present the translation of three short texts by the Soviet author [Andrei Platonov](#) that reflect aspects of this ambivalence (a fourth, already available in English, is translated into Czech only). These texts are dazzling in their revolutionary pathos, undoubtedly “Promethean” in their own way, but they also hint at the abuse of nature and the need to maintain balance in the earth’s metabolism.

It is understandable that the early period and its “original sins” are where many people look for reflections on both the promises and the failures of Soviet socialism’s ecological legacy. Later socialism is even more indelibly associated with industrialisation and environmental decay, and techno-utopian projects (such as the relocation of the entire city of Most to access the coal underneath, described by Matěj Spurný in *Making the Most of Tomorrow*, reviewed by [Bartosz Matyja](#) in the English issue). Indeed, as [Martin Babička](#) notes in his article in the English issue, this formed an important part of dissident narratives that have carried over into our post-communist condition. Several contributions to our volume challenge this narrative: Babička presents the complexity of late socialism’s attitudes to nature through the figure of the popular writer Jaromír Tomeček. The popularity of Tomeček’s nature writing provides an insight into what Babička calls “ecological techno-optimism”, which attempted to add ecological sensibilities to the techno-optimism of the previous eras, while avoiding the pessimism associated with Western environmentalism. This view rejected the Stalinist emphasis on mastery of nature in favour of more modest conceptions of control: “For late socialist writers then, the human subject was no longer the omnipotent master of nature but instead had to find ways to reconcile technological progress and ecological crisis.” (81)

Elsewhere in the English issue, [Weronika Parfianowicz](#) examines the competing visions of socialism involved in two scientific conferences organised in Poland in the early 1970s. These conferences reflected the prominence of the idea of a scientific-technological revolution and the growing prominence of expert culture. While not explicitly dedicated to ecology, these conferences were dominated by ecological themes, and participants grappled with issues of growth, consumerism, and technocracy, responding in part to the rise of Western environmentalism inspired by the publication of *The Limits to Growth* by the Club of Rome. Many of the themes that dominate contemporary ecosocialist debate – free time and automation, growth and consumerism, a hierarchy of needs and the social role of science and expertise – are already present in these conferences, not, Parfianowicz argues, as marginal or dissident voices, but formulated within the framework of official ideology: “And yet, although their critical predictions proved to be quite prophetic, it was the technocratic and pragmatic model, with all its shortcomings, that prevailed in official state politics, with serious consequences for the future.” (61)

The picture becomes complicated further when we move from official discourses to include the various voices of dissent within these regimes. One of *Contradictions’* ongoing projects has been revealing the diversity of these voices and challenging the exclusive identification of dissent with liberal politics. In this spirit, in our English

issue we present a translation of the GDR dissident [Wolfgang Harich](#)'s reaction to the 1991 report of the Club of Rome.<sup>10</sup> Writing after the fall of the Berlin Wall and at the cusp of German unification, Harich calls on the left to unite behind the Club's three central tasks of disarmament, preventing climate catastrophe, and overcoming world poverty, evoking the history of the popular front and suggesting it might give renewed impetus to internationalism. Strikingly, Harich also calls for a levelling down in the newly reunited Germany – rather than developing the East, he calls for “drastic material losses for the old federal states, combined with more social security (at an equally modest level) and improved *quality of life for all*” (124). This call, especially its desire to separate quality of life from material development, is one of the ways in which Harich's text feels deeply contemporary. A reminder, perhaps, that the events of 1989 contained multiple possibilities, or at least multiple voices, that were concealed by the official narrative. Whatever one thinks of Harich's proposed strategy, our challenges remain substantially the same.

Continuing our engagement with Marxist dissident thought, our Czech issue contains a review by [Petr Kužel](#) of a recent collection of writings from the Czech Marxist Petr Uhl (who sadly passed away last year), and we translate a review of Rudolf Bahro's *The Alternative in Eastern Europe* by a central figure of the New Left in Britain, [Raymond Williams](#), published in *New Left Review* in 1980. In it, Williams notes the shared vocabulary of cultural revolution between Bahro and the New Left, arguing that this denotes a significant line of division in Marxist theory and socialist practice. The crucial significance of this line of division runs between those who believe it is sufficient to change the *relations* of production and those who believe it is also necessary to revolutionise the *forces* of production, “which are never only manual or mechanical, but are also (and now increasingly) intellectual means”.<sup>11</sup> Of particular relevance for the theme of ecology, the cultural revolution that Williams envisages rejects the idea that the quantitative production of more and more goods might by itself generate new social relations and consciousness: “Against this logic, the cultural revolution insists, first, that what a society needs, before all, to produce, is as many possible individuals, capable of all necessary association.”<sup>12</sup>

Which returns us to the charge of Prometheanism – if Prometheanism means a naïve faith that a quantitative expansion of humanity's productive powers is emancipatory in its own right, or that nature can be conquered or mastered once and for all,

<sup>10</sup> See Alexander Amberger, “Post-growth Utopias from the GDR: The Ecosocialist Alternatives of SED Critics Wolfgang Harich, Rudolf Bahro, and Robert Havemann from the 1970s”, *Contradictions* 5, no. 2 (2021), pp. 15–30.

<sup>11</sup> Raymond Williams, “Beyond Actually Existing Socialism”, in *Tenses of Imagination: Raymond Williams on Science Fiction, Utopia and Dystopia*, ed. Andrew Milner (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 126–148, here 131.

<sup>12</sup> Williams, “Beyond Actually Existing Socialism”, p. 143.

then this is an illusion that ought to be abandoned. Marxism has to be aware of and informed by scientific limits – in the Czech issue, [Vít Bartoš](#) offers some challenging proposals on how that might be done through dialogue with the Ukrainian socialist Sergei Podolinsky, a pioneer of ecological economics. Moreover, as Gažo’s contribution emphasises, ecosocialism should provide a vital counterpoint to those trends in contemporary leftism that see solutions in accelerated development and increased consumption. And yet we might not give up on the figure of Prometheus too quickly. On the contrary, the climate crisis demands a Prometheanism of a different kind: not heroic action dominating and conquering nature, but urgent (and no less heroic) action to consciously intervene to undo the damage that has already been done. Whatever form that takes – and there are real debates to be had about the merits of degrowth, green (new) deals,<sup>13</sup> rewilding, and geoengineering – it is clear that none of this will happen without conscious action, and without a collective subject able and willing to carry it out. The climate crisis demands nothing less than “socialised man, the associated producers, govern[ing] the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their common control, instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature.”<sup>14</sup>

This, in turn, points to a further sense of Prometheanism worth holding onto. As our interview with Foster discusses, any meaningful transition requires social relations of substantive equality and democracy that allow us to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary production, and to determine and articulate our needs free from the “needs” of capital. In the spirit of Williams’s cultural revolution, we might also anticipate deeper transformations of ourselves and our relationships with nature and others (including, perhaps our relationship to non-human animals, discussed in [Julita Skotarska](#)’s review of a set of essays on factory farming), perhaps beyond what we can imagine. This is the sense in which the Salvage Collective argues that eco-modernists are not Promethean enough, and propose a Prometheanism in which Prometheus “must be, not bound by, perhaps, but *sublated* with a rigorous humility”.<sup>15</sup> The climate crisis should teach us to respect nature and its limits; it should not stop us hoping for a transformed world.

But such hope is in short supply. Any movement for ecosocialism has to confront powerful forces of reaction and denialism. The most prominent and virulent form of

<sup>13</sup> Gažo, in this issue, discusses how ecococialism and degrowth are variously counterposed and seen as complimentary. Likewise, Gareth Dale has argued there is substantial overlap among the “left corners” of both movements. Gareth Dale, “Degrowth and the Green New Deal”, *The Ecologist*, October 28, 2019, <https://theecologist.org/2019/oct/28/degrowth-and-green-new-deal>.

<sup>14</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1991, p. 959).

<sup>15</sup> Salvage Collective, *The Tragedy of the Worker*, p. 82.

this – the dark alliances between fossil fuel politics and the far right – are detailed by Andreas Malm and the Zetkin Collective, in *White Skin, Black Fuel*, reviewed by [Steve Knight](#) in the English issue. Much of this is familiar to our region, from Václav Klaus’s outright climate denial, through the Polish government’s insistence that coal is a part of Polish culture, to the repeated refrain that climate change is a plot of the far left. Communism somehow stands accused of conspiring to first destroy the environment and then to use its defence as a way to sneak back into power. But post-communism also enables a softer denialism: as [Joseph Grim Feinberg](#) notes in his essay in this issue, reflecting on five years of the journal and laying out some principles for its work, the revolutions of 1989 were often presented as revolutions of “people against concepts”, in which revolutionaries “passionately defended the remarkable idea that ideas as such were the problem, that fancy concepts should be replaced by basic common sense, lofty vision replaced by a cynical recognition of lowly human nature, complicated social theory replaced by unvarnished and obvious truth.” (161) This legacy enables “sensible” politicians to profess their green credentials and recognise the reality of climate change while condemning the level of action necessary as “extremist” and “alarmist”.<sup>16</sup>

One thing we did not anticipate when preparing the issue was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in March 2022. This made several of *Contradictions* themes once again into issues for global debate – the legacy of communism, invoked both by Putin’s startling attempts to blame the Bolsheviks for Ukraine’s independence and the determination of new Cold Warriors to see in his actions a return to the Soviet Union; the imperial history of the region and its many nationalisms; and the urgent need to talk about the region and its history without clichés. There is little we can do in this text beyond condemning the invasion and extending our solidarity to its victims, including the millions displaced as refugees. However, the war has also had severe consequences for the central theme of our issue: as well as the direct environmental devastation and the looming food crisis it causes, the war risks setting back what little progress has been made towards emissions reductions. Fossil fuel companies sense an opportunity to shift the narrative, using the energy crisis caused by Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas to reassert themselves in political debate. It seems to be working, as Germany extends the lifespan of coal generators, Dutch coal plants ramp up to 100% capacity, and Austria reopens a coal plant closed in 2020.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, wildfires rage

<sup>16</sup> Martin Vrba, “Od popíračství k ekofašismu. Stručné dějiny klimatického reakcionářství”, *Alarm*, May 30, 2022, <https://a2larm.cz/2022/05/od-popiracstvi-k-ekofasismu-strucne-dejiny-klimatickeho-reakcionarstvi>.

<sup>17</sup> Katrin Bennhold and Jim Tankersley, “Ukraine War’s Latest Victim? The Fight Against Climate Change”, *New York Times*, June 26, 2022, <https://nytimes.com/2022/06/26/world/europe/g7-summit-ukraine-war-climate-change.html>.

across Siberia, the forces that might otherwise deal with them diverted to Ukraine,<sup>18</sup> and research into the impact of the climate crisis on the Arctic stalls as collaboration with Russian scientists becomes more difficult.<sup>19</sup>

But there are signs of hope in growing movements in our region that tackle the causes and consequences of the climate crisis. In the Czech Republic, some of the most lively recent protests have been by school students participating in Fridays for Future.<sup>20</sup> The group *Limity jsme my* (We Are the Limits) have organised direct action against coal plants, sometimes marching behind the slogan “burn borders, not coal”.<sup>21</sup> *Nová dohoda* have brought the slogan of the New Deal to the Central European context, linking the climate crisis to issues of economic democracy and forging encouraging links between trade unions and climate activists.<sup>22</sup> In September 2021, the climate camp in Slovakia began with the blockade of the port of Bratislava in protest at the construction of a liquified natural gas terminal.<sup>23</sup> In Poland, ecological movements after 1989 tended to focus on questions of wildlife conservation and air quality;<sup>24</sup> in recent years, however, the principles of environmental justice have become more prominent in the activity of newer movements, such as XR Poland, *Młodzieżowy Strajk Klimatyczny* (Youth Strike for Climate), or Polish Climate Camp, inspired by similar structures in different countries.<sup>25</sup>

Often these movements involve not only ecological concerns for the future, but immediate threats to community life, in which social and ecological crises are closely intertwined. In Germany, local residents are campaigning against the destruction of their villages for lignite mining, defending both their immediate homes and the broader

<sup>18</sup> Martin Kuebler, “Wildfires in Russia: Will war in Ukraine limit firefighting response?” *Deutsche Welle*, May 11, 2022, <https://dw.com/en/wildfires-in-russia-will-war-in-ukraine-limit-firefighting-response/a-61753044>.

<sup>19</sup> Alexandra Witze, “Russia’s war in Ukraine forces Arctic climate projects to pivot”, *Nature* 607 (July 2022), p. 432.

<sup>20</sup> See Petr Zewlakk Vrabec, “‘Z důvěry ve falešné sliby jsme vyrostli,’ říkají středoškoláci. Skončil klimatický sjezd studentů”, *Alarm*, September 12, 2022, <https://a2larm.cz/2022/09/z-duvery-ve-falesne-sliby-jsme-vyrostli-rikaji-stredoskolaci-skoncil-klimaticky-sjezd-studentu>.

<sup>21</sup> “O Nás”, *Limity jsme my*, accessed November 6, 2022, <https://limityjsmemy.cz/about>.

<sup>22</sup> “Úvod: propojené krize, propojená řešení”, *Nová dohoda*, accessed November 6, 2022, <https://novadohoda.cz/nova-dohoda>.

<sup>23</sup> Petr Zewlakk Vrabec, “Historicky první slovenský klimakemp začal okupací bratislavského přístavu”, *Alarm*, September 4, 2021, <https://a2larm.cz/2021/09/historicky-prvni-slovensky-klimakemp-zacal-okupaci-bratislavskeho-pristavu>.

<sup>24</sup> On initiatives against smog and wildlife preservation (up to 2017), as well as ecological traditions in state-socialist Poland, see, e.g., Julia Szulecka and Kacper Szulecki, “Between domestic politics and ecological crises: (De)legitimization of Polish environmentalism”, *Environmental Politics* 31, no. 7, pp. 1214–1243.

<sup>25</sup> “O nas”, *Extinction Rebellion Polska*, accessed November 6, 2022, <https://extinctionrebellion.pl/>; “O nas”, *Młodzieżowy Strajk Klimatyczny*, accessed November 6, 2022, <https://msk.earth>.



environment. Serbia saw mass protests against the opening of Lithium mines.<sup>26</sup> Environmentalists in Bulgaria have long campaigned against the proliferation of landfills and incinerators, a consequence of the EU's internal "Trash Market" that has developed since 2018.<sup>27</sup> In Russia, the biggest protests around the landfill question appeared in the north of the country, near a small train station called Shies. This movement was led by local residents, who established a commune on the site designated for a new landfill and after many months of struggle successfully blocked its construction.<sup>28</sup> Shies became a symbol of social and ecological engagement, and the movement connected to it remains active in different issues (with anti-war posts frequently appearing on their Facebook pages).

Of course, there remains a huge gap between the capacity of these movements and the necessity posed by the climate crisis. There is considerable debate about how to get from where we are to where we need to be. These strategic questions are raised briefly in our interview with Foster, and discussed further by [Tereza Reichelová](#) in our Czech issue in her review of two recent books by Andreas Malm. Elsewhere in the volume, broader questions of social movement strategy and transition are taken up by [Yuliya Moskvina](#), in her discussion piece on the experiences of the Prague autonomous social centre Klinika and campaigns for the right to the city, [Matej Ivančik](#), in his review of a recent work on Marxist theories of transition, and by [Maja Vusilović](#)'s discussion of Ewa Majewska's notion of weak resistance in her review of *Feminist Antifascism*. These raise questions of movement tactics, how they engage with and influence state power, and how to build alliances across them. The question, for example, of how the left should relate to and understand contemporary populism and liberal democracy is discussed further in [Roman Kanda](#)'s review of Joseph Grim Feinberg, Michael Hauser, and Jakub Ort's *Politika jednoty ve světě proměn* (*The Politics of Unity in a World of Change*). All of these debates about strategy are of course inseparable from ongoing discussions about the world we want to build, and ultimately who is going to build it.

<sup>26</sup> See Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, "Mining Companies and the EU Want Serbia's Lithium", *Jacobin*, January 18, 2022, <https://jacobin.com/2022/01/serbian-lithium-rio-tinto-environmental-protest-movement-eu>.

<sup>27</sup> Jana Tsoneva, "How Europe's 'Trash Market' Offloads Pollution on Its Poorest Countries", *Jacobin*, June 13, 2020, <https://jacobin.com/2020/06/european-union-green-new-deal-garbage-waste>.

<sup>28</sup> For basic information on Shies in English, see, e.g., "Russia: The Shies Anti-garbage Activists", *Deutsche Welle*, July 6, 2019, <https://dw.com/en/russia-the-shies-anti-garbage-activists/av-49278120>; "The Shies camp: How Moscow's trash became treasure for a group of environmental protestors", *Bellona*, January 21, 2022, <https://bellona.org/news/industrial-pollution/2020-01-the-shies-camp-how-moscows-trash-became-treasure-for-a-group-of-environmental-protestors>; Arjo Kvamme, "Balancing the thin line between political and ecological protest. A study of the Shies protest" (MA thesis, Universitetet i Bergen, 2021). On landfill protests in Russia in general, see Geir Flikke, "Dysfunctional orders: Russia's rubbish protests and Putin's limited access order", *Post-Soviet Affairs* 37, no. 5 (2021), pp. 470–488.

Here, again, humility is important. Marxists will likely have more to learn from emerging new movements against climate catastrophe than we have to teach them, and we should not be surprised if they frame their struggles in ways we do not expect. Ecosocialism, however, has a history nearly as long as capitalism's fatal destruction of our environment, and we can all learn from it. In that spirit, we hope that this volume makes a small contribution to uncovering that common history; it is as necessary as ever.

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